Strangely clad men at secret research bases were rushing tests for a weapon which could well decide the outcome of any future war: the long-range guided missile. In scores of factories scientists worked full blast to develop a pilotless weapon which could span continents with a thermonuclear bomb. But in Wash-ington there was anxious questioning. Was the U.S. missile program, for all the effort, really lagging behind that of the Russians?
The Russians boasted that they already had "mighty guided missiles"—and some highly placed Americans believed this. Senator Henry Jackson, criticizing U.S. progress, had said that the Soviet Union was nearly ready to fire a ballistic missile capable of hitting a target 1.500 miles away. The U.S. Air Force's own missile expert, Trevor Gardner, resigned as assistant secretary of the Air Force because, he said, he was denied the kind of backing which would enable the U.S. to keep ahead. President Eisenhower himself stepped into the argument. "In certain fields," he said, "I am sure we are well ahead of the other side. In certain fields I think they are probably ahead of us."
Amid the arguments Defense Secretary Charles Wilson announced that he would appoint a missile "czar." The czar would be armed with an estimated 82 billion appropriation in the first year alone to run a crash program similar to World War II's A-bomb Manhattan Project. The goal would be 1) to meet the possible Russian 1,500-mile threat with a U.S. intermediate missile, 2) to maintain a defensive lead with a greater weapon, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM). Already in its arsenal the U.S. has the Snark which, however, has limitations as a long-range missile, and the Army's short-range Redstone .
.jpg)
Social Plugin